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Abstract- Detecting and identifying e-banking Phishing 
websites is really a complex and dynamic problem 
involving many factors and criteria. Because of the 
subjective considerations and the ambiguities involved in 
the detection, Fuzzy Data Mining Techniques can be an 
effective tool in assessing and identifying e-banking 
phishing websites since it offers a more natural way of 
dealing with quality factors rather than exact values. In 
this paper, we present novel approach to overcome the 
„fuzziness‟ in the e-banking phishing website assessment 
and propose an intelligent resilient and effective model for 
detecting e-banking phishing websites. The proposed 
model is based on Fuzzy logic combined with Data Mining 
algorithms to characterize the e-banking phishing website 
factors and to investigate its techniques by classifying 
there phishing types and defining six e-banking phishing 
website attack criteria‟s with a layer structure. A Case 
study was applied to illustrate and simulate the phishing 
process. Our experimental results showed the significance 
and importance of the e-banking phishing website criteria 
(URL & Domain Identity) represented by layer one, and 
the variety influence of the phishing characteristic layers 
on the final e-banking phishing website rate. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
E-banking Phishing websites are forged website that are 
created by malicious people to mimic real e-banking websites. 
Most of these kinds of Web pages have high visual similarities 
to scam their victims. Some of these Web pages look exactly 
like the real ones. Unwary Internet users may be easily 
deceived by this kind of scam. Victims of e-banking phishing 
Websites may expose their bank account, password, credit 
card number, or other important information to the phishing 
Web page owners. The impact is the breach of information 
security through the compromise of confidential data and the 
victims may finally suffer losses of money or other kinds. 
Phishing is a relatively new Internet crime in comparison with 
other forms, e.g., virus and hacking. More and more phishing 
Web pages have been found in recent years in an accelerative 
way [7]. The word phishing from the phrase ―website 
phishing‖ is a variation on the word ―fishing.‖ The idea is that 
bait is thrown out with the hopes that a user will grab it and 
bite into it just like the fish. In most cases, bait is either an e-
mail or an instant messaging site, which will take the user to 
hostile phishing websites [10].  
E-banking Phishing website is a very complex issue to 
understand and to analyze, since it is joining technical and 
social problem with each other for which there is no known 
single silver bullet to entirely solve it. The motivation behind 
this study is to create a resilient and effective method that uses 
Fuzzy Data Mining algorithms and tools to detect e-banking 
phishing websites in an automated manner. 
DM approaches such as neural networks, rule induction, and 
decision trees can be a useful addition to the fuzzy logic 
model. It can deliver answers to business questions that 
traditionally were too time consuming to resolve such as, 
"Which are most important e-banking Phishing website 
Characteristic Indicators and why?" by analyzing massive 
databases and historical data for training purposes. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
literature review and related work. Section 3 shows the result 
of our 2 phishing case studies. Section 4 shows the theory and 
methodology of the proposed fuzzy based data mining 
approach for the phishing website risk assessment model. 
Section 5 introduces the system design and implementation 
with the overall fuzzy data mining inference rules. Section 6 
reveals the experiments and results of the fuzzy data mining e-
banking phishing website risk assessment model and then 
conclusions and future work are given in Section 7. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RELATED WORK 
A. Literature Review 
     Phishing website is a recent problem, nevertheless due to 
its huge impact on the financial and on-line retailing sectors 
and since preventing such attacks is an important step towards 
defending against e-banking phishing website attacks, there 
are several promising approaches to this problem and a 
comprehensive collection of related works. In this section, we 
briefly survey existing anti-phishing solutions and list of the 
 2 
related works. One approach is to stop phishing at the email 
level [3], since most current phishing attacks use broadcast 
email (spam) to lure victims to a phishing website [21]. 
Another approach is to use security toolbars. The phishing 
filter in IE7 [19] is a toolbar approach with more features such 
as blocking the user‘s activity with a detected phishing site. A 
third approach is to visually differentiate the phishing sites 
from the spoofed legitimate sites. Dynamic Security Skins [5] 
proposes to use a randomly generated visual hash to customize 
the browser window or web form elements to indicate the 
successfully authenticated sites. A fourth approach is two-
factor authentication, which ensures that the user not only 
knows a secret but also presents a security token [6]. 
However, this approach is a server-side solution. Phishing can 
still happen at sites that do not support two-factor 
authentication. Sensitive information that is not related to a 
specific site, e.g., credit card information and SSN, cannot be 
protected by this approach either [22]. 
 Many industrial antiphishing products use toolbars in Web 
browsers, but some researchers have shown that security tool 
bars don‘t effectively prevent phishing attacks. [4], [5] 
proposed a scheme that utilises a cryptographic identity-
verification method that lets remote Web servers prove their 
identities. However, this proposal requires changes to the 
entire Web infrastructure (both servers and clients), so it can 
succeed only if the entire industry supports it. [13] Proposed a 
tool to model and describe phishing by visualizing and 
quantifying a given site‘s threat, but this method still wouldn‘t 
provide an antiphishing solution. Another approach is to 
employ certification, e.g., 
(microsoft.com/mscorp/twc/privacy/spam), [14], [15], [17], 
[1]. A recent and particularly promising solution was proposed 
in [8] to combine the technique of standard certificates with a 
visual indication of correct certification; a site-dependent logo 
indicating that the certificate was valid would be displayed in 
a trusted credentials area of the browser. A variant of web 
credential is to use a database or list published by a trusted 
party, where known phishing web sites are blacklisted. For 
example Netcraft antiphishing toolbar 
http://toolbar.netcraft.com/ prevents phishing attacks by 
utilising a centralized blacklist of current phishing URLs. 
Other Examples include Websense, McAfee‘s anti–phishing 
filter, Netcraft anti-phishing system, Cloudmark SafetyBar, 
and Microsoft Phishing Filter [16]. The weaknesses of this 
approach are its poor scalability and its timeliness. Note that 
phishing sites are cheap and easy to build and their average 
lifetime is only a few days. APWG provides a solution 
directory at (Anti-Phishing Working Group) [2] which 
contains most of the major antiphishing companies in the 
world. However, an automatic antiphishing method is seldom 
reported. The typical technologies of antiphishing from the 
User Interface aspect are done by [5] and [22]. They proposed 
methods that need Web page creators to follow certain rules to 
create Web pages, either by adding dynamic skin to Web 
pages or adding sensitive information location attributes to 
HTML code. However, it is difficult to convince all Web page 
creators to follow the rules [7].  In [12], [7], [13], the DOM-
based [20] visual similarity of Web pages is oriented, and the 
concept of visual approach to phishing detection was first 
introduced. Through this approach, a phishing Web page can 
be detected and reported in an automatic way rather than 
involving too many human efforts. Their method first 
decomposes the Web pages (in HTML) into salient (visually 
distinguishable) block regions. The visual similarity between 
two Web pages is then evaluated in three metrics: block level 
similarity, layout similarity, and overall style similarity, which 
are based on the matching of the salient block regions [7]. 
B. Main Characteristics of e-banking phishing websites. 
      Evolving with the antiphishing techniques, various 
phishing techniques and more complicated and hard-to-detect 
methods are used by phishers. The most straightforward way 
for a phisher to defraud people is to make the phishing Web 
pages similar to their targets. Actually, there are many 
characteristics and factors that can distinguish the original 
legitimate website from the forged e-banking phishing website 
like Spelling errors, Long URL address and Abnormal DNS 
record. The full list is shown in table I which will be used later 
on our analysis and methodology study.  
 
Table I. COMPONENTS AND LAYERS OF E-BANKING PHISHING 
WEBSITE CRITERIA. 
Criteria N Component Layer No. 
URL & Domain 
Identity 
 
(Weight = 0.3) 
1 Using the IP Address  
Layer One 
 
 
Sub weight = 0.3 
2 Abnormal Request URL 
3 Abnormal URL of 
Anchor 
4 Abnormal DNS record 
5 Abnormal URL 
Security & 
Encryption 
 
(Weight = 0.2) 
1 Using SSL certificate  
Layer Two 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub weight = 0.4 
2 Certification authority 
3 Abnormal Cookie 
4 Distinguished Names 
Certificate(DN) 
Source Code & 
Java script 
 
(Weight = 0.2) 
 
1 Redirect pages 
2 Straddling attack 
3 Pharming Attack 
4 Using onMouseOver to 
hide the Link 
5 Server Form Handler 
(SFH) 
Page Style & 
Contents 
 
(Weight =0.1) 
 
1 Spelling errors  
 
 
Layer Three 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub weight = 0.3 
2 Copying website 
3 Using forms with 
―Submit‖ button 
4 Using Pop-Ups windows 
5 Disabling Right-Click 
Web Address 
Bar 
 
(Weight = 0.1) 
 
1 Long URL address 
2 Replacing similar 
characters for URL  
3 Adding a prefix or suffix 
4 Using the @ Symbol to 
Confuse 
5 Using Hexadecimal 
Character Codes 
Social Human 
Factor 
(Weight = 0.1) 
1 Much emphasis on 
security and response 
2  Public generic salutation 
3 Buying Time to Access 
Accounts 
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Total Weight 1 
C. Why using Fuzzy Logic and Data Mining? 
 FL has been used for decades in the engineering sciences to 
embed expert input into computer models for a broad range of 
applications. It offers a promising alternative for measuring 
operational risks [18]. The FL approach provides more 
information to help risk managers effectively manage 
assessing and ranking e-banking phishing website risks than 
the current qualitative approaches as the risks are quantified 
based on a combination of historical data and expert input. 
The advantage of the fuzzy approach is that it enables 
processing of vaguely defined variables, and variables whose 
relationships cannot be defined by mathematical relationships. 
FL can incorporate expert human judgment to define those 
variable and their relationships.  
DM is the process of searching through large amounts of 
data and picking out relevant information. It has been 
described as "the nontrivial extraction of implicit, previously 
unknown, and potentially useful information from large data 
sets [30], [31]. It is a powerful new technology with great 
potential to help researchers focus on the most important 
information in their data archive. Data mining tools predict 
future trends and behaviors, allowing businesses to make 
proactive, knowledge-driven decisions [32].  
 
III. CASE STUDIES: 
 
Two Case studies were applied to illustrate and simulate the 
phishing process 
 
A. Case Study: Phone Phishing Experiment & Analysis. 
 
For my testing specimen, a group of 50 employees were 
contacted by female colleges assigned to lure them into giving 
away their personal ebanking accounts user name and 
password (through social and friendly conversations with a 
deceiving purpose in mind). The results were astonishingly 
beyond expectations; many of the employees fell for the trick. 
After conducting friendly conversation with them for some 
time, my team managed to seduce them into giving away their 
internet banking credentials for fake reasons. Some of these 
lame reasons included checking their privileges and 
accessibility, or for checking its integrity and connectivity 
with the web server for maintenance purposes, account 
security and privacy assurance …etc. To assure the 
authenticity of our request and to give it a social dimensional 
trend, my team had to contact them repeatedly for about three 
or four time. 
 
My team managed to deceive 16 out of the 50 employees to 
give away their full ebanking credentials (user name and 
password) which represented 32% of the sample. This 
percentage is considered a high one especially when we know 
that the victims were staff members of Jordan Ahli Bank, who 
are supposed to be highly educated with regard to the risks of 
electronic banking services. 
A total of 16% (8 employees) agreed to give their user name 
only and refrained from giving away their passwords under 
any circumstances or excuses what so ever. 
The remaining 52% (26 employees) were very cautious and 
declined to reveal any information regarding their credentials 
over the phone. 
 
Table II: Phone Phishing experiment 
  
 
An overview of the results as shown in figure 1 reveals the 
high risk of social engineering security factor. Social 
engineering constitutes a direct internal threat to ebanking web 
services since its hacks directly and internally into the 
accounts of ebank customers. 
 
 Phone phishing experiment interact response Chart
Giving away their full ebanking 
credentials(user name & 
Password), 16, 32%
Giving away only their 
ebanking 
user name without password, 
8, 16%
Refused to reveal their 
credentials or 
any kind of information, 26, 
52%
Giving away their full ebanking 
credentials(user name & Password)
Giving away only their ebanking 
user name without password
Refused to reveal their credentials or 
any kind of information
 
Figure 1: Phone phishing response chart 
 
The results also show the direct need to increase the awareness 
of customers not to fall victims of this kind of threat that can 
lead to devastating results. 
 
 
B. Case Study: Website Phishing Experiment & Analysis: 
 
I engineered a website for phishing practice and study. The 
website was an exact replica of the original Jordan Ahli Bank 
website www.ahlionline.com.jo designed to trap users and 
induce them by targeted phishing email to submit their 
credentials (username and password). The specimen was 
inclusive of my colleagues at Jordan Ahli Bank after attaining 
the necessary authorizations from our management. 
Response to Phone Phishing 
 experiment 
Number of  
employees 
Giving away their full ebanking  
credentials(user name & Password) 16 
Giving away only their ebanking  
user name without password 8 
Refused to reveal their credentials or  
any kind of information 26 
Total 50 
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I targeted 120 employees with my deceiving phishing email 
informing them that their ebanking accounts are at the risk of 
being hacked and requested them to log into their account 
through fake link attached to my email using their usual 
customer ID and password to verify their balance and then log 
out normally. 
Table III: Phishing experiment 
 
Deceiving phishing email 
 
E-banking Services BES 
 
We have automatically reviewed your accounts recently and 
we suspect that they were tampered with by an unauthorized 
third party. Protecting the security of your account and our 
network is our primary concern. Therefore, as a preventative 
measure, we have deactivated the services in your account that 
are liable for breaching and we kindly ask you to thoroughly 
follow the hereunder procedures to ascertain that your account 
is intact. 
 Login to your Internet Banking account. 
 Enter your Customer ID and Password as usual. 
 Review your recent account history for any 
unauthorized withdrawals or deposits. Report to us 
immediately if you suspect any unauthorized activity 
has taken place on your account. 
 After checking, we will automatically update your 
account records and reconnect it with the main web 
server database. Confirmation message will appear to 
you after successful update and reactivation of your 
account. 
“Thank you, Your record has been updated 
successfully” 
 To get started,  please click on the link below: 
 
https://www.ahli.com/ahlionline 
 
We apologize for any inconvenience this may cause, and 
appreciate your assistance in helping us maintain the integrity 
of the entire ebanking system. Thank you for your prompt 
attention to this matter. 
  
Sincerely, 
 
Banking Electronic Services Team 
 
 
 
The web site successfully attracted 52 out of the 120-targeted 
employees representing 44%, who interacted positively by 
following the deceiving instructions and submitting their 
actual credentials (customer ID, Password).  
 
Surprisingly IT department employees and IT auditors 
constituted 8 out of the 120 victims representing 7%, which 
shocked me, since I expected them to be more alert than 
others. 
From other departments 44 employees of the 120-targeted 
employee‘s victims representing 37%, fell into the trap and 
submitted their credentials without any hesitation. 
The remaining 68 out of 120 representing 56% were divided 
as follows: 28 employees supplied incorrect info, which seems 
to indicate a wary curiosity representing 23%; and 40 
employees, received the email, but did not respond at all 
representing 33%.  
 
 
The results clearly indicate as shown in figure 2 that target 
phishing factor is extremely dangerous since almost half of the 
employees who responded were victimized; particularly, 
trained employees such as those of IT Department and IT 
Auditors. 
Increasing the awareness of all users of ebanking regarding 
this risk factor is highly recommended; this includes 
customers and employees alike. 
 
 
 
Phishing experiment interact response Chart
interacted positively (Other 
Departments), 44, 37%
interacted negatively (Incorrect 
info), 28, 23%
interacted negatively (No 
response) , 40, 33%
interacted positively (IT 
Department), 8, 7%
interacted positively (IT Department)
interacted positively (Other Departments)
interacted negatively (Incorrect info)
interacted negatively (No response) 
 
Figure 2: Website phishing response chart 
 
 
C.  Reactions analysis to my phishing experiment: 
We recognized that all the employees who fell for the phishing 
attempt, have no reaction (as they probably never realized that 
it was a phishing attack); employees who did not fall for it, 
either never saw the email (as it went directly to their spam 
folder) and therefore had no reaction, or simply classified it as 
a phishing attack and ignored it. 
 
While some subjects saw the educational value of the 
experience, and appreciated the insights they had gained as a 
result of being part of the study, there were more users who 
Response to Phishing 
 experiment 
Number of  
employees 
Interacted positively (IT Department) 8 
Interacted positively (Other Departments) 44 
Interacted negatively (Incorrect info) 28 
Interacted negatively (No response)  40 
Total 120 
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felt that the study had no value, and felt violated at not having 
been asked permission before the experiment was performed.  
 
Interestingly, none of the employees admitted to having been 
fooled by the spoofed email and phished banking website, but 
all of those who were angry were either angry ‖on behalf of a 
friend‖ who had fallen for it, or upset in rather general terms. 
This suggests that there is a clear stigma associated with 
having been victimized (whether any real damage was done or 
not), which in turn tells us to be suspicious of the results given 
by surveys of phishing (Peter Finn and Markus Jakobsson, 
2006).  
 
Some of the employees called the experiment unethical, 
inappropriate, illegal, unprofessional, and/or fraudulent. These 
reactions highlight that phishing has a significant 
psychological cost to victims. Even though no sensitive 
information about the victims was retained (or even ever 
stored) in this study, some victims were clearly upset that the 
phishers had tricked them and violated their privacy. 
 
Many employees stated that they did not and would never fall 
for such an attack. This natural denial reaction suggests that 
we may find it hard to admit to our own vulnerability. As a 
consequence many successful phishing attacks may go 
unreported, making phishing success rates from surveys 
severely underestimated. 
 
Some employees were convinced that the experimenters had 
hacked into their email accounts. This reaction highlights two 
concerns: first, few people understand how easy it is to spoof 
messages; second, many users overestimate the security and 
privacy of email. 
 
These reactions highlight that some users do not appreciate the 
potential ramifications of the information that they willingly 
disclose on the Web. 
It is not clear to them that anyone (without ethical concerns) 
can easily gather their personal information and that in most 
cases there are no consequences for the offender.  
 
We found as a conclusion that phishers know that most users 
don‘t know how to check the security and often assumes that 
sites requesting sensitive information are secured. When users 
don‘t know how secured they are, they assumed that they are 
secured, it‘s not easy for them to see the difference between 
authentic security and mimicked security features. We also 
found that some visual deception attacks can fool even the 
most sophisticated users. These results illustrate that standard 
security indicators are not effective for a substantial fraction of 
users, and suggest that alternative approaches are needed. 
 
Indicators that are designed to signal trustworthiness were not 
understood (or even noticed) by many participants. Some 
participants only used the content of the website to evaluate its 
authenticity, without looking at any other portions of the 
browser. A number of participants incorrectly said a padlock 
icon is more important when it is displayed within the page 
than if presented by the browser. Other participants were more 
persuaded by animated graphics, pictures, and design touches 
such as favicons (icons in the URL bar) than SSL indicators. 
Knowing this, phishers can falsify a rich and fully functioning 
site with images, links, logos and images of security indicators, 
and a significant fraction of our participants were confident 
that the spoofed websites were legitimate. Similarly, 
legitimate organizations that follow security precautions, such 
as allowing users to only login from dedicated SSL protected 
pages, are penalized and were judged by some of our 
participants to be less trustworthy. 
 
 
My case study experiments points to the need for extensive 
educational campaigns about phishing and other security 
threats. People can become less vulnerable by a heightened 
awareness of the dangers of phishing, the importance of 
reporting attacks to which they fall victims, the ease of 
spoofing, and the possible (mis)uses of personal information 
posted on the Web (Tom Jagatic, et al., 2005). 
 
 
IV. The Proposed Fuzzy based Data Mining Approach 
A. Fuzzy Data Mining Algorithms & Techniques 
The approach described here is to apply fuzzy logic and 
data mining algorithms to assess e-banking phishing website 
risk on the 27 characteristics and factors which stamp the 
forged website. The essential advantage offered by fuzzy logic 
techniques is the use of linguistic variables to represent Key 
Phishing characteristic indicators and relating e-banking 
phishing website probability.  
 
1) Fuzzification 
In this step, linguistic descriptors such as High, Low, 
Medium, for example, are assigned to a range of values for 
each key phishing characteristic indicators. Valid ranges of the 
inputs are considered and divided into classes, or fuzzy sets. 
For example, length of URL address can range from ‗low‘ to 
‗high‘ with other values in between. We cannot specify clear 
boundaries between classes. The degree of belongingness of 
the values of the variables to any selected class is called the 
degree of membership; Membership function is designed for 
each Phishing characteristic indicator, which is a curve that 
defines how each point in the input space is mapped to a 
membership value between [0, 1]. Linguistic values are 
assigned for each Phishing indicator as Low, Moderate, and 
High while for e-banking Phishing website risk rate as Very 
legitimate, Legitimate, Suspicious, Phishy, and Very phishy 
(triangular and trapezoidal membership function). For each 
input their values ranges from 0 to 10 while for output, ranges 
from 0 to 100. 
 
An example of the linguistic descriptors used to represent one 
of the key phishing characteristic indicators (URL Address 
Long) and a plot of the fuzzy membership functions are 
shown in figure 3. The fuzzy representation more closely 
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matches human cognition, thereby facilitating expert input and 
more reliably representing experts‘ understanding of 
underlying dynamics [4]. 
 
 
Figure 3. Input variable for Long URL Address component 
 
The same approach is used to calibrate the other 26 Key 
Phishing Characteristic Indicators.  
2) Rule Generation using Classification Algorithms. 
      Having specified the risk of e-banking phishing website 
and its key phishing characteristic indicators, the next step is 
to specify how the e-banking phishing website probability 
varies. Experts provide fuzzy rules in the form of if…then 
statements that relate e-banking phishing website probability 
to various levels of key phishing characteristic indicators 
based on their knowledge and experience. On that matter and 
instead of employing an expert system, we utilised data 
mining classification and association rule approaches in our 
new e-banking phishing website risk assessment model as 
shown in figure 4 to automatically find significant patterns of 
phishing characteristic or factors in the e-banking phishing 
website archive data. Particularly, we used a number of 
different existing data mining classification techniques 
implemented within WEKA [27] and CBA packages [33]. 
JRip [34] WEKA's implementation of RIPPER, PART [34], 
Prism [35] and C4.5 [36] algorithms are selected to learn the 
relationships of the selected different phishing features. We 
have chosen these algorithms since the learnt classifiers are 
easily understood by human [29]. While for the association 
finding we have used the apriori [37] and predictive apriori 
algorithm [38] using WEKA.  
 
Figure 4. E-banking Phishing Website Risk Assessment Model 
 
We used two web access archives, one from APWG 
archive [2] and one from Phishtank archive [39]. We managed 
to extract 6 different feature sets from the e-banking phishing 
website archives, and then derived many important rules 
which helped us very much in fuzzy rule phase. 
  
3) Aggregation of the rule outputs.  
 
     This is the process of unifying the outputs of all discovered 
rules. Combining the membership functions of all the rules 
consequents previously scaled into single fuzzy sets (output).  
 
4) Defuzzification. 
 
     This is the process of transforming a fuzzy output of a 
fuzzy inference system into a crisp output. Fuzziness helps to 
evaluate the rules, but the final output has to be a crisp 
number. The input for the defuzzification process is the 
aggregate output fuzzy set and the output is a number. This 
step was done using Centroid technique [40] since it is a 
commonly used method. The output is e-banking phishing 
website risk rate and is defined in fuzzy sets like ‗very 
phishy‘ to ‗very legitimate‟. The fuzzy output set is then 
defuzzified to arrive at a scalar value. 
 
B. Data Sets and Experimental Results 
 
Two publicly available datasets were used to test our 
implementation: the ―phishtank‖ from the phishtank.com [39] 
(which it is considered one of the primary phishing-report 
collators both the 2007 and 2008 collections, for a total of 
approximately 606 e-banking phishing websites, The 
PhishTank database records the URL for the suspected 
website that has been reported, the time of that report, and 
sometimes further detail such as the screenshots of the website, 
and the publicly available. The Anti Phishing Working 
Group(APWG) which maintains a ―Phishing Archive‖ 
describing phishing attacks dating back to September 2007 [2]. 
We performed a cognitive walkthrough on the approximately 
1006 sample attacks within this archive. We used a series of 
short scripts to programmatically extract the above features, 
and store these in an excel sheet for quick reference as shown 
in figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5. Excel sheet of the ebanking phishing main extracted features. 
 
Our goal is to gather information about which strategies are 
used by attackers and to formulate hypotheses about 
classifying and categorizing all different e-banking phishing 
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attacks techniques. By thoroughly investigating these phishing 
attacks we‘ve created a data set containing information 
regarding what different techniques have been used and how 
the usage of these techniques has changed over time. We have 
found from investigating these information some interesting 
techniques depending on the main perception that phishers 
know that most users don‘t know how to check the security 
and often assumes that sites requesting sensitive information 
are secure which makes very difficult for them to see the 
difference between authentic security and mimicked security 
features [23]. We also found that some visual deception 
attacks can fool even the most sophisticated users. These 
results illustrate that standard security indicators are not 
effective for a substantial fraction of users, and suggest that 
alternative approaches are needed [24]. 
 
C. Mining e-banking Phishing Websites Challenges 
 
There are a number of challenges posed by doing post-
hoc classification of e-banking phishing websites. Most of 
these challenges only apply to the e-banking phishing websites 
data and materialize as a form of information, which has the 
net effect of increasing the false negative rate. The age of the 
dataset is the most significant problem, which is particularly 
relevant with the phishing corpus. E-banking Phishing 
websites are short-lived, often lasting only in the order of 48 
hours. Some of our features can therefore not be extracted 
from older websites, making our tests difficult. The average 
phishing site stays live for approximately 2.25 days [25]. 
Furthermore, the process of transforming the original e-
banking phishing website archives into record feature datasets 
is not without error. It requires the use of heuristics at several 
steps. Thus high accuracy from the data mining algorithms 
cannot be expected. However, the evidence supporting the 
golden nuggets comes from a number different algorithms and 
feature sets and we believe it is compelling[26]. 
 
D. Utilization of different DM Classification algorithms 
 
The practical part of this study utilises five different 
common DM algorithms (C4.5, Ripper, Part, Prism, CBA). 
Our choice of these methods is based on the different 
strategies they use in learning rules from data sets [28].  The 
C4.5 algorithm employs divide and conquer approach, and the 
RIPPER algorithm uses separate and conquer approach. The 
choice of PART algorithm is based on the fact that it combines 
both approaches to generate a set of rules. It adapts separate-
and-conquer to generate a set of rules and uses divide-and-
conquer to build partial decision trees. The way PART builds 
and prunes partial decision tree is similar to the C4.5 
implementation with a difference which can be explained as 
follows: C4.5 generates one decision tree and uses pruning 
techniques to simplify it; each path from the root node to one 
of the leaves in the tree represents a rule. On the other hand, 
PART avoids the simplification process by building up partial 
decision trees and choosing only one path in each one of them 
to derive a rule. Once the rule is generated, all instances 
associated with it, and the partial tree will be discarded. 
PRISM is a classification rule which can only deal with 
nominal attributes and doesn't do any pruning. It implements a 
top-down (general to specific) sequential-covering algorithm 
that employs a simple accuracy-based metric to pick an 
appropriate rule antecedent during rule construction. Finally, 
CBA algorithm employs association rule mining [33] to learn 
the classifier and then adds a pruning and prediction steps. 
This results in a classification approach named associative 
classification [41 ] [42]. 
We recorded the prediction accuracy of the considered 
classification approaches we used in this study in Table IV 
and Table V. The overall summary output can be interpreted 
as: Web Address Bar and URL Domain Identity are the major 
important criteria for identifying and detecting e-banking 
phishing website. Such as if one or both of them is genuine 
then most likely the website is legitimate and on the other 
hand if it is Fraud, then the website is most likely phishing. 
The classification rules did not just showed the significance 
roll of the Web Address Bar criteria and URL Domain Identity 
criteria but showed also the magnitude value of some other e-
banking phishing website criteria like Security & Encryption 
criteria comparing to the others. We have used ten-fold-cross-
validation as a testing mode which evaluating the derived 
classifiers. Cross validation is a well-known testing method in 
DM and machine learning communities.  
 
Table IV. Results from WEKA classifier using 4 methods applied to 
websites archive to classify phishing 
 C4.5 
Decision 
Tree 
 
P.A.R.T. 
JRip 
R.I.P.P.E.R. 
PRISM 
Test Mode 10 FOLD CROSS VALIDATION 
Attributes 
URL DOMAIN IDENTITY        SECURITY & ENCRYPTION 
 SOURCE CODE & JAVA         PAGE STYLE & CONTENTS   
WEB ADDRESS BAR                 SOCIAL HUMAN FACTOR  
                                           CLASS 
Number  of 
Rules 
57 38 14 155 
Correctly 
Classified 
848  
(84.294 %) 
869  
(86.381 %) 
818    
(81.312%) 
855    
(84.990%) 
Incorrectly 
Classified 
158  
(15.705 %) 
137  
(13.618 %) 
188    
(18.687 %) 
141  
(14.016 %) 
Number of 
instances 
1006 1006 1006 1006 
 
 
Table V. Results from CBA classifier using association rule mining 
applied to websites archive to classify phishing 
 Mine: 
Single Sup 
Mine: 
Multi Sup 
Num of Test Case  1006 1006 
Correct Prediction  758 713 
Error Rate  24.652% 29.125% 
MinSup 20.000% 10.000% 
MinConf 100.000% 100.000% 
RuleLimit  80000 80000 
LevelLimit 6 6 
Number of rules 22 15 
V. SYSTEM DESIGN 
In this paper, e-banking phishing website detection rate is 
performed based on six criteria: URL & Domain Identity, 
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Security & Encryption, Source Code & Java script, Page Style 
& Contents, Web Address Bar, and Social Human Factor as 
shown in Table III. This table also shows that there are 
different numbers of components for each criterion, five 
components for URL & Domain Identity, Source Code & Java 
script, Page Style & Contents, and Web Address Bar, 
respectively. Four components for Security & Encryption, and 
three components for Social Human Factor. Therefore, there 
are twenty seven components in total. There are three layers 
on this e-banking phishing website fuzzy data mining model 
as shown in Figure 6. The first layer contains only URL & 
Domain Identity criteria with a weight equal to 0.3 for its 
importance; the second layer contains Security & Encryption 
criteria and Source Code & Java script criteria with a weight 
equal to 0.2 each; the third layer contains Page Style & 
Contents criteria, Web Address Bar criteria And Social 
Human Factor criteria with a weight equal to 0.1 each. The six 
criteria have been classified and prioritized through mining the 
e-banking phishing website archive database using the 
classification and association algorithms mentioned earlier. 
  
Using the IP Address
Abnormal Request URL
Abnormal URL of Anchor URL & Domain Identity
Abnormal DNS record
Abnormal URL
Anomalous SSL certificate
Conflicting certification authority
Abnormal Cookie Security & Encryption
Inconsistent Distinguished Names (DN)
Redirect pages Layer Two
Straddling attack
Pharming Attack Source Code Java script
Using onMouseOver to hide the Link
Server Form Handler (SFH)
E-banking Phishing 
Website  
 Risk Rate
Spelling errors
Copying website
Using forms with “Submit ” button Page Style & Contents
Using Pop-Ups windows
Disabling Right-Click
Long URL address
Replacing similar characters for URL 
Adding a prefix or suffix Web Address Bar Layer Three
Using the @ Symbol to Confuse
Using Hexadecimal Character Codes
 Emphasis on security and response
 Public generic salutation Social Human Factor
Buying Time to Access Accounts
Structure of the fuzzy inference overall system to evaluate website phishing rate  
Figure 6. Structure of the fuzzy data mining inference overall system to 
evaluate e-banking phishing website risk rate. 
 
E-banking Phishing Website Rating = 0.3 * URL & Domain 
Identity crisp [First layer] +  ((0.2 * Security & Encryption 
crisp)+(0.2 * Source Code & Java script crisp)) [Second layer] 
+ ((0.1 * Page Style & Contents crisp) +(0.1 * Web Address 
Bar crisp) + (0.1 * Social Human Factor crisp)) [Third layer]   
 
A. Overall Fuzzy Data Mining Inference Rules 
1) The Rule Base1 for layer 1. 
     The rule base has five input parameters and one output and 
contains all the ―IF-THEN‖ rules of the system. For each entry 
of the rule base, each component is assumed to be one of three 
values and each criterion has five components. Therefore, the 
rule base 1 contains (3
5
) = 243 entries. The output of rule base 
1 is one of the e-banking phishing website rate fuzzy sets 
(Genuine, Doubtful or Fraud) representing URL & Domain 
Identity criteria phishing risk rate. A sample of the structure 
and the entries of the rule base 1 for layer 1 are shown in 
Table VI. The system structure for URL & Domain Identity 
criteria is the joining of its five components (Using the IP 
Address, Abnormal Request URL, Abnormal URL of Anchor, 
Abnormal DNS record and Abnormal URL), which produces 
the URL & Domain Identity criteria (Layer one).  
 
TABLE VI.  SAMPLE OF THE RULE BASE 1 STRUCTURE AND 
ENTRIES FOR URL & DOMAIN IDENTITY CRITERIA 
R
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1 Low Low Low Low Low Genuine 
2 Low Low Low Low Mod. Genuine 
3 Low Low Mod. Mod. Mod. Doubtful 
4 Low Low Low Mod. high Doubtful 
5 Low Low Mod. Mod. high Fraud 
6 Mod. Mod. Mod. Low high Fraud 
7 Mod. Low high Mod. high Fraud 
8 high Mod. Low Mod. Low Doubtful 
9 Low Mod. Low Low Mod. Fraud 
10 high Mod. high high Low Fraud 
2) The Rule Base for layer 2. 
      In Layer 2, there are two inputs, which are (Security & 
Encryption and Source Code & Java script) and one output. 
The system structure for Security & Encryption criteria is the 
joining of its four components (Using SSL certificate, 
Certification authority, Abnormal Cookie and Distinguished 
Names Certificate(DN)) using Rule base 1, which produces 
Security & Encryption criteria. The system structure for 
Source Code & Java script criteria is the joining of its five 
components (Redirect pages, Straddling attack, Pharming 
Attack, Using onMouseOver to hide the Link and Server Form 
Handler (SFH)) using Rule base 1, which produces Source 
Code & Java script criteria. The structure and the entries of the 
rule base for layer 2 are illustrated in Table VII. The system 
structure for layer 2 is the combination of two e-banking 
phishing website criteria (Security & Encryption and Source 
Code & Java script), which produces rule base 2. The rule 
base contains (3
2
) = 9 entries and the output of rule base 2 is 
one of the e-banking phishing website rate fuzzy sets (Legal, 
Uncertain or Fake) representing Layer Two criteria phishing 
risk rate. 
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TABLE III. THE RULE BASE 2 STRUCTURE AND ENTRIES FOR 
LAYER TWO 
Rule 
Security & 
Encryption 
Source Code & 
Java script 
Phishing  Risk 
(Layer Two) 
1 Genuine Genuine Legal 
2 Genuine Doubtful Legal 
3 Genuine Fraud Uncertain 
4 Doubtful Genuine Uncertain 
5 Doubtful Doubtful Uncertain 
6 Doubtful Fraud Uncertain 
7 Fraud Genuine Uncertain 
8 Fraud Doubtful Fake 
9 Fraud Fraud Fake 
3) The Rule Base for layer 3. 
      In Layer 3, there are three inputs, which are: the Page 
Style & Contents, Web Address Bar and Social Human Factor 
which is the output from layer 3, and one output. The system 
structure for Page Style & Contents criteria is the joining of its 
five components (Spelling errors, Copying website, Using 
forms with ―Submit‖ button, Using Pop-Ups windows and 
Disabling Right-Click) using Rule base 1, which produces 
Page Style & Contents criteria. The system structure for Web 
Address Bar criteria is the joining of its five components 
(Long URL address, Replacing similar characters for URL, 
Adding a prefix or suffix, Using the @ Symbol to Confuse and 
Using Hexadecimal Character Codes) using Rule base 1, 
which produces Web Address Bar criteria. The system 
structure for Social Human Factor criteria is the joining of its 
three components (Much emphasis on security and response, 
Public generic salutation and Buying Time to Access 
Accounts) using Rule base 1, which produces Social Human 
Factor criteria. 
A sample of the structure and the entries of the rule base for 
layer 3 are shown in Table VIII. The system structure for layer 
3 is the combination of Page Style & Contents, Web Address 
Bar and Social Human Factor, which produces rule base 3. 
The rule base contains (3
3
) = 27 entries and the output of rule 
base 3 is one of the e-banking phishing website rate fuzzy sets 
(Legal, Uncertain or Fake) representing Layer Three criteria 
phishing risk rate. 
 
TABLE IX. THE RULE BASE 3 STRUCTURE AND ENTRIES FOR 
LAYER THREE 
R
u
le
  Page Style 
& Contents 
Web 
Address Bar 
Social Human 
Factor 
Phishing  Risk 
(Layer Three) 
 
1 Genuine Genuine Doubtful Legal 
2 Genuine Doubtful Fraud Uncertain 
3 Genuine Fraud Doubtful Uncertain 
4 Doubtful Doubtful Genuine Uncertain 
5 Doubtful Doubtful Doubtful Uncertain 
6 Doubtful Fraud Doubtful Fake 
7 Doubtful Genuine Genuine Legal 
8 Fraud Doubtful Doubtful Uncertain 
9 Fraud Fraud Fraud Fake 
4) The Rule Base for final e-banking phishing website rate. 
In the e-banking phishing website rule base last phase, there 
are three inputs, which are: layer one, layer two and layer 
three, and one output which is the rate of the e-banking 
phishing website. The structure and the entries of the rule base 
for e-banking phishing website rate are shown in Table IX. 
The system structure for is the combination of layer one, layer 
two and layer three, which produces final e-banking phishing 
website rule base. The three dimensional plots of this structure 
is shown in Figure 7 using MATLAB. The rule base contains 
(33) = 27 entries and the output of final e-banking phishing 
website rule base is one of the final output fuzzy sets (Very 
Legitimate, Legitimate, Suspicious, Phishy or Very Phishy) 
representing final e-banking phishing website rate. 
 
TABLE IIII. THE E-BANKING PHISHING WEBSITE RATE RULE BASE 
STRUCTURE AND ENTRIES FOR FINAL PHISHING RATE 
R
u
le
  URL & 
Domain 
Identity   
Layer Two Layer 
Three  
Final e-banking 
phishing website 
Rate 
1 Genuine Legal Legal Very Legitimate 
2 Genuine Legal Uncertain Legitimate 
3 Genuine Legal Fake Suspicious 
4 Genuine Uncertain Legal Suspicious 
5 Genuine Uncertain Uncertain Suspicious 
6 Genuine Uncertain Fake Phishy 
7 Genuine Fake Legal Suspicious 
8 Genuine Fake Uncertain Suspicious 
9 Genuine Fake Fake Phishy 
10 Doubtful Legal Legal Legitimate 
11 Doubtful Legal Uncertain Suspicious 
12 Doubtful Legal Fake Suspicious 
13 Doubtful Uncertain Legal Suspicious 
14 Doubtful Uncertain Uncertain Suspicious 
15 Doubtful Uncertain Fake Phishy 
16 Doubtful Fake Legal Phishy 
17 Doubtful Fake Uncertain Phishy 
18 Doubtful Fake Fake Very Phishy 
19 Fraud Legal Legal Suspicious 
20 Fraud Legal Uncertain Suspicious 
21 Fraud Legal Fake Phishy 
22 Fraud Uncertain Legal Suspicious 
23 Fraud Uncertain Uncertain Phishy 
24 Fraud Uncertain Fake Phishy 
25 Fraud Fake Legal Phishy 
26 Fraud Fake Uncertain Very Phishy 
27 Fraud Fake Fake Very Phishy 
 
 
Figure 7. Three-dimensional plots for final phishing rate 
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VI. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
 
     Clipping method [9] is used in aggregating the 
consequences and the aggregated surface of the rule 
evaluation is defuzzified using Mamdani method [11] to find 
the Center Of Gravity (COG). Centroid defuzzification 
technique shown in equation (1) can be expressed as where x* 
is the defuzzified output, µi(x) is the aggregated membership 
function and x is the output variable.  
 
 
Equation (1) 
 
     The proposed intelligent e-banking Phishing website 
detection system has been implemented in MATLAB 6.5. The 
results of some input combinations are listed in Tables X, XI 
and XII.   
The final e-banking phishing website risk rating will be 
balanced (54%) representing a [suspicious website], when the 
Layer one (URL & Domain Identity) of the e-banking 
phishing website risk criteria has 10 input values which 
indicate High phishing indicator and all other layers have the 
value of zero inputs as shown in Table X. Same result can be 
made when all e-banking phishing website risk criteria‘s 
representing by the three layers have middle (5) input values 
which indicate Mod. phishing indicator. These results shows 
the significance and importance of the e-banking phishing 
website criteria (URL & Domain Identity) represented by 
layer one especially when compared to the other criteria‘s and 
layers. Table XI shows that when the Layer one and Layer two 
of the e-banking phishing website risk criteria has middle (5) 
input values which indicate Mod. phishing indicator and other 
third Layer has the value of 10 input values which indicate 
High phishing indicator, the final e-banking phishing website 
risk rating will be reasonably high (72%) representing a 
[phishy website], which means that there is a Good guarantee 
that the website is forged phishy website,. This result clearly 
shows that even if some of the e-banking phishing website 
characteristics or layers are not very clear or not definite, the 
website can still be phishy and forged and users should be a 
ware when dealing with it especially when other phishing 
characteristics or layers are obvious and clear. 
    Table XII show that when the Layer one of the e-banking 
phishing website risk criteria (URL & Domain Identity) has 
middle (5) input values which indicate Mod. phishing 
indicator and all other Layers has the value of zero input 
values which indicate Low phishing indicator, the final e-
banking phishing website risk rating will be reasonably low 
(39%) representing a [legitimate website], which means that 
there is Good guarantee that the website is legitimate website. 
This result clearly shows that even if some of the e-banking 
phishing website characteristics or layers are noticed or 
observed, that does not mean at all that the website is phishy 
or forged, but it can be safe and secured especially when other 
phishing characteristics or layers are not noticeable, visible or 
detectable. The results also indicates that the worst e-banking 
phishing website rate (all three layers have 10 input value) 
equals 83.7% representing [Very Phishy Website] and the best 
e-banking phishing website rate (all three layers have 0 input 
value) is 16.4% representing [Very Legitimate Website] rather 
than a full range, i.e. 0 to 100, because of the fuzzification 
process 
 
TABLE X. FIVE HIGHEST (10) FOR LAYER ONE  AND ALL OTHERS 
LOWEST (0). 
C
o
m
p
 
 
Layer 
One 
URL & 
Domain 
Identity   
Layer Two Layer Three % 
ebanking 
phishing 
website  
Rating 
Security 
& 
Encrypti
on 
Source 
Code & 
Java 
script 
Page 
Style & 
Contents 
Web 
Address 
Bar 
Social 
Human 
Factor 
1 10 0 0 0 0 0  
54% 2 10 0 0 0 0 0 
3 10 0 0 0 0 0 
4 10 0 0 0 0  
5 10  0 0 0  
 
TABLE XI. FIVE MIDDLE (5) INPUTS FOR LAYER ONE AND LAYER 
TWO AND HIGHEST (10) INPUTS FOR LAYER THREE. 
C
o
m
p
 
 
Layer 
One 
URL & 
Domain 
Identity   
Layer Two Layer Three % 
ebanking 
phishing 
website  
Rating 
Security 
& 
Encrypti
on 
Source 
Code & 
Java 
script 
Page 
Style & 
Contents 
Web 
Address 
Bar 
Social 
Human 
Factor 
1 5 5 5 10 10 10  
72% 2 5 5 5 10 10 10 
3 5 5 5 10 10 10 
4 5 5 5 10 10  
5 5  5 10 10  
 
TABLE IIIII. FIVE MIDDLE (5) INPUTS FOR LAYER ONE AND ALL 
OTHERS LOWEST (0) INPUTS. 
C
o
m
p
 
 
Layer 
One 
URL & 
Domain 
Identity   
Layer Two Layer Three % 
ebanking 
phishing 
website  
Rating 
Security 
& 
Encrypti
on 
Source 
Code & 
Java 
script 
Page 
Style & 
Contents 
Web 
Address 
Bar 
Social 
Human 
Factor 
1 5 0 0 0 0 0  
39% 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 
3 5 0 0 0 0 0 
4 5 0 0 0 0  
5 5  0 0 0  
 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
     The fuzzy data mining e-banking phishing website model 
showed significance and importance of the e-banking phishing 
website criteria (URL & Domain Identity) represented by 
layer one. It also showed that even if some of the e-banking 
phishing website characteristics or layers are not very clear or 
not definite, the website can still be phishy especially when 
other phishing characteristics or layers are obvious and clear. 
On the other hand even if some of the e-banking phishing 
website characteristics or layers are noticed or observed, that 
does not mean at all that the website is phishy, but it can be 
safe and secured especially when other phishing 
characteristics or layers are not noticeable, visible or 
detectable. 
    Our first goal was to determine whether we could find any 
golden nuggets in the e-banking phishing website archive data 
using classification algorithms. In this, major rules discovered 
were inserted into the fuzzy rule engine to help giving exact 
phishing rate output. A major issue in using data mining 
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algorithms is the preparation of the feature sets to be used. 
Finding the ―right‖ feature set is a difficult problem and 
requires some intuition regarding the goal of data mining 
exercise. We are not convinced that we have used the best 
feature sets and we think that there is more work to be done in 
this area. Moreover, there are a number of emerging 
technologies that could greatly assist phishing classification 
that we have not considered. In the meantime, however, we 
believe that using features such as those presented here can 
significantly help with detecting this class of e-banking 
phishing websites. The classification approaches are 
promising. The training and classification experiments have 
proven that it is possible to improve the categorization process. 
The progress of detecting e-banking phishing websites is 
really very interesting with a never ending possibility of 
algorithms variations when it is combined with each others.  
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